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Abstract: This paper investigates PTM behaviour and currency invoicing decisions of 
Canadian pork exporters in the presence of menu costs. It is shown that when export prices 
are negotiated in the exporter’s currency, menu costs cause threshold effects in the sense that 
there are bounds within (outside of) which PTM is not (is) observed. Conversely, PTM is not 
interrupted by menu costs when export prices are denominated in the importer’s currency. 
The empirical model focuses on pork meat exports from Canada to the U.S. and Japan. 
Hansen’s (2000) threshold estimation procedure is used to jointly test for currency invoicing 
and PTM in the presence of menu costs. Inference is conducted using bootstrap methods. 
PTM effects are smaller when accounting for currency invoicing decisions and menu costs 
than under standard linear models. The data does not reject the null hypothesis that Quebec 
pork exporters exercise PTM behaviour in the Japanese market and invoice their sales in 
Japanese currency. Evidence of PTM behaviour and foreign currency invoicing is weak for 
the U.S. market. Ontario pork exporters do not exercise PTM behaviour in any market. 
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A JOINT TEST OF PRICING-TO-MARKET, MENU COST AND CURRENCY INVOICING 
 
1. Introduction 
Krugman (1986) defined the concept of pricing to market (PTM) in international trade as the 
case in which exporting firms charge different prices in foreign and domestic markets. There 
exists a considerable literature documenting evidence of PTM in international markets.   
Knetter (1989) was the first to document PTM effects when analyzing the pricing strategies 
of German and American firms. Since then, the literature has followed two different paths.   
One strand of the literature has focused on the macroeconomic implications of PTM. For 
example, Bergin and Feenstra (2001) blame PTM behaviour for the high degree of volatility 
in exchange rates.  
The other, and more popular, strand of the literature concentrates on PTM’s 
microeconomic implications. At the manufacturing level, Uctum (2003) and Sasaki (2002) 
analyzed the PTM behaviour of Japanese exporting firms. Gil-Pareja (2002) found that the 
degree of mark-up adjustment in response to exchange rate changes is similar across export 
markets. Similarly, agri-food sectors are known to exhibit PTM effects. For example, Carew 
and Florkowski (2003) found price discriminatory behaviour by Canadian and U.S. exporters 
of agri-food products. Brown (2001) found PTM effects in pricing of Canadian canola 
exports. Other studies include Griffith and Mullen’s (2001) analysis of Australia’s rice 
exports and Pick and Carter’s (1994) wheat study. 
  On the other hand, the literature related to currency invoicing is a little thinner. 
Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998) surveyed the literature on currency invoicing and trade. 
Most studies deal with the apparent stylized fact that international transactions are invoiced in 
the exporters’ currency. Others have analyzed the role of currency invoicing as an exchange 
rate risk hedging strategy (Donnenfeld and Haug, 2003; Johnson and Pick, 1997).   2
The concept of pricing-to-market is intrinsically linked to currency invoicing; yet few 
authors have formally tied the two concepts. One notable exception is Sato (2003). He uses 
an empirical model that distinguishes short-run and long-run pricing strategies of Japanese 
exporters. Exporters can stabilize their export prices by adjusting their profit margin and 
invoicing in the importer’s currency. Standard estimation techniques usually capture the long-
run pure PTM effect of export pricing decisions (explained by the curvature of the importers’ 
demand function), but cointegration techniques are required for the estimation of short-run 
effects as well (stabilization effect of currency invoicing). 
Larue, Gervais and Rancourt (2003) found a case for which currency invoicing has 
important implications when measuring PTM effects. They investigated PTM behaviour in 
the presence of menu costs. Menu costs are incurred by firms whenever they make changes to 
their pricing strategies.
1 Their theoretical model demonstrates that when export prices are 
negotiated in the exporter’s currency, menu costs trigger threshold effects in the sense that 
there are bounds within (outside of) which pricing-to-market is not (is) observed. 
Interestingly, they also show that PTM is not interrupted by menu costs when export prices 
are denominated in the importer’s currency.
2 Their empirical application focuses on pork 
meat exports from Canadian provinces to the U.S. and Japan. Canadian pork exporters were 
found to exercise market power on the U.S. market. The threshold model did not reject the 
null hypothesis of menu cost given the assumption that exports were invoiced in Canadian 
currency. Evidence of PTM behaviour in the Japanese market was weaker.  
The objective of this paper is to jointly test the null hypothesis of menu cost, pricing 
to market and currency invoicing decisions. In contrast with previous studies, we find that the 
evidence of market power is weaker when not restricting a priori the currency invoicing 
decisions such that they are carried out in the exporting country’s currency. The null 
hypothesis of no menu costs in the PTM relation is strongly rejected by the data. However,   3
the data rejects the null hypothesis of domestic currency invoicing. The empirical model also 
fails to reject the joint null hypothesis of foreign currency invoicing and no PTM behaviour 
in two out of four PTM equations.  
The next section lays out the theoretical model that explains price rigidity when 
exporters are facing menu costs related to changing their prices. The third section presents the 
empirical model and jointly tests the PTM assumption under menu cost and currency 
invoicing options using pork exports from two Canadian provinces (Quebec and Ontario) to 
Japan and the U.S. The last section presents concluding remarks. 
  
2. The Theoretical model 
In this section, the model of Larue et al (2003) is used to illustrate the impact of menu costs 
and currency invoicing on pricing-to-market. In the tradition of Klemperer’s (1987) switching 
costs models, we assume that firms have a two-period planning horizon. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that there are only two firms selling differentiated products. Firm 1, based in country 
1, enjoys a monopoly position in its domestic market, but it competes with firm 2 in country 
2. Ignoring menu costs for the time being, and assuming that firm 1 sets its export price in its 
local currency, the profit of firm 1 at time t is defined as: 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) 1, 11, 11, 11, 12, 12, 12, 22, 1 11, 11, 12, 12, 22, ,, t t t t t t tt t t t t tt t pq p pq p ep cq p q p ep π =+ − +  (1) 
where   , ij t p  and  , ij t q  are the price and quantity chosen by firm i to be sold in country j at time 
t, et is the exchange rate expressed in terms of country 1’s currency per unit of country 2’s 
currency and  () . i c  is a cost function. Prices  11,t p  and  12,t p  are denominated in country 1’s 
currency while  22,t p  is denominated in country 2’s currency. Accordingly, the profit of firm 2 
at time t is: 
() ( ) () 2, 22, 22, 12, 22, 2 22, 12, 22, 2, ,, , t t tt tt tt tt t pq p ep cq p ep π ω =−  (2)   4
It is assumed that () ./ 0 iQ i i cc Q ≡∂ ∂ >  where  i Q  is the total quantity produced by firm i.  It is 
also assumed that marginal cost is constant, i.e.  ( )
22 ./ 0 iQQ i cc Q ≡ ∂∂ = .   
With or without menu costs, it is assumed that play in country 2 is sequential with 
firm 1, the leader, announcing its price first. The home firm, Firm 2, enjoys the second-mover 
advantage on its own turf by announcing its price last. It also seems natural to have retailers 
in country 2 inquire about firm 2’s price after getting firm 1’s price quote, especially if it is 
costly for firm 1 to communicate with buyers in country 2. Conducting business in a foreign 
tongue with partners who have a distinct business culture can put an exporting firm at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis home firms.  
In the standard price leadership game, firm 1 picks prices  11,t p  and  12,t p  for each new 
realization of  t e , taking into account that firm 2 will be able to undercut its price.  Defining 
firm 2’s reaction function as  ( ) 22, 12, 2, max tt t t pp eA r g π ≡ , then firm 1’s profit can be 
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 (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the disadvantaged leader must equate its marginal 
revenues from domestic and export sales to its marginal costs. The domestic price equation in 
(3) can be manipulated to yield the more familiar monopoly rule:  () 11, 11, 1 11 tt Q p c ε += .   
Equation (4) shows the direct and indirect effects of a change in  12,t p  on firm 1’s profit. The 
former is simply the usual incentive of a firm to exploit the export demand for its product.    5
The indirect effect originates from firm 1’s knowledge that firm 2 enjoys a strategic 
advantage in observing  12,t p  prior to choosing  22,t p .     
The effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium prices can be obtained by total 
differentiation of the first order conditions and the application of Cramer’s rule. It can be 
shown that  11, 0 tt dp de =  because the cost function is linear (i.e., constant marginal and 
average costs) and no inputs are imported. These are the necessary conditions to analyze 
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 (5) 
where  0 H >  from the second order condition. Furthermore, given that  12, 1 0 tQ pc −> , it 
follows that the expression in (5) is unambiguously positive. Under these conditions, the ratio 
11, 12, tt p p  falls with  t e . This is the standard “pricing-to-market” outcome described in 
Bowen, Viaene and Hollander (1998). It is also possible to show that firm 1’s export price 
expressed in country 2’s currency actually falls as country 1’s currency depreciates (i.e., 
() 12, // 0 tt t pee ∂∂ < ), an outcome usually referred to as an incomplete pass-through. 
  Let us now assume that when firm 1 wants to change  12,t p , it must incur a fixed menu 
cost m.
3  In the 2
nd period, firm 1 makes its decision about changing its period 1 price or 
keeping it, with knowledge of the exchange rate in period 2.  Hence it would not change its 
period 1 price in period 2 if : 
() () 1,2 12,1 2 1,2 12,2 2 ;; p ep e m ππ ≥− . (6)   6
Forcing this relation to hold with equality enables us to define boundaries for period 2’s 
exchange rate within which the firm will not find it profitable to change its price. The 
existence of these boundaries follows from the concavity of profit with respect to price. 
Hence, define the boundaries  ()
min
21 2 , 1 , ep m  and   ( )
max
21 2 , 1 , ep m  whose difference is increasing 
with the menu cost.  
Figure 1 illustrates these bounds using a numerical simulation under the assumptions 
of linear demand (i.e.,  ,, , ij t ij t t ij jj t qa p e p γ =− + ), constant marginal cost and  1 1 e = .
4  The 
parameters  12 γ  and  21 γ  indicate the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign 
products in country 2; the higher these parameters are, the less differentiated are firm 1 and 
2’s products from the consumers’ perspective. As argued earlier, the exchange rate 
boundaries are widening in the menu cost. If the two goods are close substitutes 
() 12 21 0.8 γγ == , the boundaries are closer to one another than when differentiation is higher 
() 12 21 0.5 γγ == . In the latter case, the two firms face less stringent competition in country 
2’s market. As such, the variation in the exchange rate between the two periods needs to be 
large to make it profitable for firm 1 to change its price for a given menu cost. 
In period 1, firm 1 knows that it will keep its period 1 price in period 2 as long as 
min max
22 2 , ee e ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ . We assume that the firms’ period 1 expectation of the exchange rate in 
period 2 is [ ] 12 Ee. For simplicity, let us assume that the exchange rate is drawn from a 
uniform distribution with support [ ] , ee, a mean of ( ) 2 ee − , and that the parameter values 
are such that 
min max
22 ee e e <<< . Hence, there is a probability  ()
min max
22 2 prob e e e << =  
() () ( )
max min
22 0,1 ee e e −− ∈  that firm 1 will keep its period 1 price in period 2. Therefore, 
firm 1’s optimization in period 1, given discounting parameter  1 ϕ < , is as follows:    7
() () ( )
min max
1,1 11,1 12,1 1 2 2 2 1,2 11,2 12,1 max , ; ; , , ; p p e prob e e e e e E p p m πϕ π ⎡ ⎤ +≤ ≤⎣ ⎦. (7) 
The first order conditions are: 
() ( ) 1,2 1,1 1,1
1,2








⎡⎤ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎡⎤ =+ + = ⎣⎦ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
 (8) 
The first expression reflects firm 1’s ability to adjust its domestic market price without 
having to incur a menu cost.   Hence, unless  21 ee = , firm 1’s domestic price will be subject to 
another optimization in period 2 and will change.  The second expression makes it plain that 
the choice of export price must weigh the conditions prevailing in the market in period 1 
against the ones expected to prevail in period 2.  The extent by which firm 1’s profit in the 2
nd 
period must be taken into account in its 1
st period optimization depends on the probability 
that the menu cost will be larger than the marginal gain from a price change when it is 
costless to do so.  It should be noted that this probability is directly influenced by the menu 
cost m and by the choice of  12,1 p  as indicated by the implicit definition of the bounds in (6).   
If firm 1 knew with certainty that the exchange rate would fall outside the bounds (i.e., 
2 e ∈
min max
22 , ee ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , it would simply set  1,1 12,1 0 p π ∂ ∂=  in choosing  12,1 p .    
  The introduction of menu costs implies that there is a probability that the export price, 
expressed in country 1’s currency, will remain constant (i.e.,  12,1 12,2 p p = ) or will rise or fall 
depending on the realization of the exchange rate in period 2. A “small” depreciation of the 
domestic currency will not trigger changes in  11 p  and  12 p , but it will make firm 1’s export 
sales cheaper for foreign buyers because the ratio  12,2 2 p e  falls.  As a result, we should not 
observe a pricing-to-market outcome in spite of our uncompetitive market structure. The 
same applies to a “small” appreciation of country 1’s currency. The domestic-export price 
ratio would not respond to changes in exchange rate if the new exchange rate fell within the 
critical bounds. Systematic movements are expected when the exchange rate deviation is   8
large enough to bring the new exchange rate above (below) the upper (lower) threshold. This 
is why threshold econometric techniques are most suited to empirically ascertain the validity 
of the theoretical model.   
A key assumption in the model is that firm 1 gets paid in its own currency.  If its price 
were denominated in country 2’s currency, then interruptions in pricing-to-market outcomes, 
like the ones described above, would not be possible. Based on the theoretical model of Larue 
et al. (2003), we write the profit of firm 1 when it fixes its export price in country 2’s 
currency as:  
() ( ) () ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1, 11, 11, 11, 12, 12, 12, 22, 12, 1 11, 11, 12, 12, 22, 12, ,, t t tt t t tttt tt tttt pq p e pq p p p cq p q p p p π =+ − +  (9) 
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where  0 G >  from the second order condition. 
As in the other case, a depreciation of country 1’s currency induces a decrease in firm 
1’s price denominated in country 2’s currency. However, when the price is converted in 
country 1’s currency, there is a positive relationship (i.e.,  12 0 ep e ∂ ∂> ). This implies that 
under these conditions, the ratio of prices (in country 1’s currency),  11 12 p ep , falls with e.  As 
expected, pricing-to-market behavior is robust to the denomination of export prices.     
  The introduction of menu cost implies the existence of exchange rate bounds within 
which firm 1 finds it more profitable not to update its first period price after observing the   9
realization of the exchange rate in period 2. The rigidity of  12,t p  implies a larger increase in 
12, tt ep  and hence a stronger pricing-to-market effect than in the absence of a menu cost! It 
can then be foreseen that two very different exchange rate changes, one that keeps the 
exchange rate within the bounds and one that brings it outside, can trigger identical pricing-
to-market responses. The implication for empirical analysis is that standard tests for a long 
run linear PTM relation are likely to be misleading. The rejection of a linear relation is likely 
to be misinterpreted as evidence of no long run relation between the export price and the 
exchange rate while in reality there would be one for “small” fluctuations in the exchange 
rate and one for “large” ones. Recall that when the export price is quoted in country 1’s 
currency and in the presence of a significant menu cost, evidence of PTM did not become 
stronger, but disappeared. This contrast in response suggests that the null of significant 
thresholds outside of which long-run PTM behavior is observed is a joint test of menu cost 
and invoicing in one’s own currency. 
  It must also be noted that there is a possibility that prices are quoted in a third-country 
currency that is not an interested party to the transaction. Larue et al. (2003) considered that 
case and found that the adjustment processes triggered by large exchange rate shocks (or in 
the absence of menu costs) are similar regardless of the choice of currency.  However, small 
shocks (or when menu costs matter) can unleash very different adjustment processes that are 
difficult to track theoretically. 
 
3. The Empirical model 
While Larue et al. (2003) identified significant threshold effects in the PTM relation, they did 
not formally test for the own currency invoicing decision. From a theoretical perspective, the 
contrasts in the export price responses following changes in the exchange rate suggest that the   10
null of significant thresholds outside of which adjustment to export prices are observed is a 
joint test of menu cost and own-currency invoicing. 
Hansen’s (2000) methodology is used to implement a two-regime PTM equation that 
is conditional on a threshold variable. The PTM equations are: 
0,1 1,1 2,1 tt t t p ec u θ θθ =+ + +  if  t e γ ∆≤        ( 1 3 )  
0,2 1,2 2,2 tt t t p ec u θ θθ =+ + +  if  t e γ ∆>        ( 1 4 )  
where p is the export price denominated in Canadian dollars, e is the exchange rate defined as 
units of foreign currency per Canadian dollar weighted by the destination consumer price 
index for food products, c is a marginal cost proxy and  t e ∆  is the threshold variable that is 
used to split the sample into two groups which are called regimes. The threshold is defined as 
the absolute value of the change in the exchange rate because the presence of menu costs 
defines boundaries for the exchange rate within which the firm will not find it profitable to 
change its price. The specification of the threshold implies that revising the export price in 
regime 1 is not profitable while additional profits from revising the export price in regime 
two is greater than the menu costs. The parameters  1 0,1 1,1 2,1 θ θθθ ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ , 
20 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 θθ θ θ ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  and γ  need to be estimated. The sample length is denoted by T . 
Estimation of the model in (13) and (14) is done by sequential least squares.  The 
model can be written in a single equation using a dummy variable  ( ) { } tt de γ γ =∆ ≤  such 
that  () () tt t d γγ = XX; where  t X  is the vector of independent variables in (13) and (14). The 
PTM equation is:  
() tt T t t p XX e θδ γ ′ =+ +           ( 1 5 )  
Define the OLS estimators  ˆ θ  and  ˆ
T δ  conditional on γ . The parameter γ  is assumed to be 
restricted to a bounded set  , γ γ ⎡ ⎤ Γ≡⎣ ⎦  that is approximated by a grid defined by:   11
{ } (1) ( ) ,, T qq Γ∩ … . The estimation procedure requires NT <  evaluations of equation (15); 
where N is selected such that the 10% upper and lower percentiles of { } (1) ( ) ,, T qq …  are not 
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We consider two distinct scenarios with respect to the choice of currency invoicing.  
The first scenario presumes that Canadian pork exporters invoice their exports in Canadian 
dollars. When the exchange rate variation is large enough such that it is profitable to revise 
the export price (i.e.  t e γ ∆ ≥ ), the variation in the exchange rate will produce a variation in 
the export price which will be linearly related to the exchange rate such that  1,2 10 θ −< <  
under the PTM hypothesis. In the other case (i.e.  t e γ ∆ < ), menu costs will prevent the 
adjustment of the export price and thus the 1
st regime will hold with  1,1 0 θ = . In the 2
nd 
scenario, pork exports are invoiced in the destination currency. The theoretical model shows 
that when exchange rate variations are small, no adjustment will be made to the export price 
in foreign currency, but the export price denominated in Canadian dollars will vary 
proportionally with the exchange rate and thus  1,1 1 θ = − . When the exchange rate variation is 
large enough, the export price will adjust such that  1,2 10 θ − << . 
The null hypothesis of no menu costs is a test of  12 θ θ ′ ′ = . The asymptotic theory of 
thresholds is complex; but Hansen (2000) derives the asymptotic distribution of the threshold 
parameter and the slope coefficients under certain conditions. If one assumes that the 
threshold parameter is known, the two-step least squares estimator of the regression 
coefficients converges to a normal distribution. However, this distribution is likely to under-
represent the uncertainty in the parameters in finite sample or when the threshold effect is 
small. Hansen (2000) suggests working with conservative bounds to reduce the probability of   12
wrongly rejected the null. Moreover, it is often the case that inference about the threshold 
effect is needed. If the threshold effect is represented by  12 T δ θθ ′ ′ ≡ − , Hansen shows that one 
strategy is to assume that  0 T δ →  as the sample size, T, tends to infinity. The null of  0 γ γ =  
can be tested with a likelihood ratio test whose non-standard distribution can be conveniently 
computed in closed-form. However, there is no reason to believe in our context that menu 
costs will disappear as the sample size increases. If  T δ  is fixed as T increases, the asymptotic 
distribution of the likelihood ratio test under  0 T δ →  must be regarded as asymptotically 
conservative if the error terms are normally distributed. 
While Hansen (2000) provides nice improvements in the asymptotic theory of 
threshold models, there are still important ambiguities that can have important implications in 
our setting. One alternative is to use bootstrap methods to estimate the distribution of the 
estimators and test statistics. However, the test statistics are not asymptotically pivotal in the 
sense that their distribution will depend on unknown population parameters. In that case, 
bootstrap estimates of the statistic’s distribution converge at the same rate as conventional 
asymptotic approximations (Horowitz, 2001). Improvements in the rate of convergence of the 
bootstrap can be achieved using pre-pivoting methods introduced by Beran (1988) and 
summarized in McCullough and Vinod (1998).   
To circumvent the aforementioned ambiguities in asymptotic theory, we proceed with 
bootstrap methods to test the various hypotheses of the theoretical model. Four sets of 
hypotheses will be tested. First, the null hypothesis of no menu costs will be tested 
01 2 : H θ θ ′′ = .  If we accept the alternative hypothesis of significant thresholds in the PTM 
equation and keeping in mind that e in the empirical section is defined in terms of Can$, we 
can test: a) the null hypothesis of no PTM effect or  01 , 2 :0 H θ = ; b) the null hypothesis of 
Canadian (foreign) currency invoicing or  01 , 1 :0 H θ =   ( ) 01 , 1 :1 H θ = − ; and c) the joint null   13
hypothesis of no PTM and Canadian (foreign) currency invoicing  01 , 1 1 , 2 :0 H θ θ ==  
() 01 , 2 1 , 1 :0 ; 1 H θθ == − .  
 
4. Data and estimation 
PTM equations are specified for exports from two different Canadian provinces to two 
destinations over the period beginning in January 1992 and ending in December of 2003. 
Export data were obtained from Statistic Canada while the exchange rate and the consumer 
price index for food items were collected in publications from each country’s central bank. 
The marginal cost proxy in (13) and (14) are the monthly hog prices in each province and 
were obtained from Agriculture and Agri-food Canada. The United States and Japan 
represent the most important market for Canadian pork exporters. Exports of each province 
are depicted in Figures 2a and 2b. Quebec is the largest pork meat exporting province but 
growth in exports is observed in Ontario as well over the period. Figures 3a and 3b present 
the unit export values by source for the Japanese and U.S. markets. Differences in export unit 
values are especially important at the beginning of the sample but they tend to shrink over 
time.   
Figure 4 plots the hog price in each province from January 1992 to December 2003. 
Although prices in each province follow a similar trend, there are some differences in the 
three series that can be attributed to different hog marketing institutions (Larue et al., 2000). 
Figures 5 presents the value of the real exchange rates (units of foreign currency per Can$). 
There is a steady depreciation in the real value of the Canadian currency with respect to the 
U.S. currency over the entire sample. Finally, there are wilder variations in the real value of 
the Canadian dollar with respect to the Japanese yen.   
As it is usually the case with monthly time series, the degree of integration in each 
variable is an important preoccupation. The first step of the empirical strategy is thus to   14
investigate the stochastic properties of the data. To this end, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test is implemented by regressing the first difference of a series on the lagged level of 
the series, a constant and, if needed, a time trend and w lagged first differences of the series 
to insure that the residuals are white noise:  
1 1
w
tt j t j t j yt y y α βρ υ ε −− = ∆=+ + + ∆ + ∑           ( 1 6 )  
The null of non-stationarity of the ADF test involves testing a zero restriction on ρ . 
The ADF test was implemented on the logarithmic transformation of the real 
exchange rate, export unit values and hog prices in each province. The results are reported in 
the second column of Table 1. The first column indicates whether a time trend (T) or no time 
trend (NT) were used. Following Hall’s (1994) recommendations, we used the SBC 
information criterion to select the lag length in (16) because it makes the ADF test more 
powerful in small samples than the AIC criterion. The null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected for all variables at the 90% or higher confidence level. 
  Even though the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favour of stationarity, 
the stationarity test developed by Kwiatkowski et al. [hereafter referred to as KPSS, (1992)] 
was also carried out for each series. The KPSS testing procedure differs from standard unit 
root tests since the null hypothesis is that of stationarity in the level of a series. The KPSS test 
involves estimating the equation:  
tt t yt δζε =++ ;   1 tt t u ζζ − =+ ;   ( )
2 0, tu ui i dσ ∼  (17) 
The null hypothesis of trend stationarity is about the validity of a zero restriction on 
2
u σ . 
Testing the null of level stationarity instead of trend stationarity involves regressing the series 
on a constant instead of a trend variable. The KPSS test is computed using the Bartlett kernel 
to account for the potential correlation of the residuals with a bandwidth selected using the 
procedure suggested by KPSS; i.e.  () { }
0.25
40 . 0 1 l trunc T = . The third column of table 1   15
reveals that the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected for all export unit values at the 95% 
confidence level. In contrast, hog prices in each province and the real exchange rate between 
the Canadian and Japanese currencies seem stationary. Overall, the ADF and KPSS tests 
yield conflicting evidence.     
 Carrion-i-Silvestre  et al. (2001) showed that simultaneous testing of the null 
hypotheses of stationarity and unit root should not be conducted using standard marginal 
critical values for each test. They studied a Confirmatory Data Analysis (CDA) method by 
computing critical values for the joint confirmation hypothesis of a unit root. They argue that 
their set of critical values generates more accurate results than standard critical values for 
each test when the data generation process is integrated of order one. The CDA shows that 
only two of the eight variables are integrated of order one. Hence, the analysis proceeds as if 
the variables are stationary. 
  Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of the PTM equations for pork exports from 
Quebec and Ontario to each destination (U.S. and Japan). The two regimes are identified 
separately in Table 2. The coefficient estimate and its standard error between parentheses are 
in the first line of each cell. The number underneath is the p-value for the null hypothesis of 
zero coefficient. As mentioned previously, the distribution of the coefficients is non-standard 
and bootstrap methods were implemented for inference purposes. The bootstrap procedure is 
the following. The independent variables in (15) are treated as fixed as well as the threshold 
variable. The regression vector of residuals ˆ
* e  constitutes the empirical distribution that is 
used for the bootstrap. A sample of T observations is drawn with replacement from the 
empirical distribution under the null hypothesis considered. Using the bootstrapped sample, 
the model in (15) is estimated with and without the restriction implied by the hypothesis and 
a test statistic is computed:  ( )
** * ˆˆ
j t θ σθ = . This procedure is repeated 2000 times
5 and the 
percentage of draws for which the simulated statistic exceeds the actual test statistic is   16
computed.
6 This value is the bootstrap estimate of the asymptotic p-value for the t-statistic 
under the null hypothesis. 
  The point estimate for the real exchange rate in each regime of the PTM equations 
always has the expected algebraic sign in Table 2. The coefficient of the hog price is always 
significant in the 2
nd regime of the PTM equations but the point estimate in the first regime is 
not statistically different from zero in two PTM equations. Moreover, the two coefficients 
have a positive algebraic sign which runs counter to the intuition that an increase in 
processors’ marginal cost will increase their export price and lower their sales.
7 
The null hypothesis of no threshold is tested using the likelihood ratio statistic 
proposed by Hansen (2000),  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 00 LR T S S S γ γγ γ == =− ; where  () ˆ S γ  and 
() 0 S γ =  are respectively the sum of squared residuals for models with and without 
threshold. The p-value is computed by simulating a sample of T observations under the null 
hypothesis and computing the number of times that the bootstrap statistic falls below the 
actual LR statistic. The LR statistic always rejects the null hypothesis of no threshold at the 5 
percent significance level.
8 It should be noted that the threshold value in Table 2 does not 
provide a direct estimate of menu costs. The threshold variable is function of menu cost but 
also of the structural parameters of demand in the importing country. Hence, a large threshold 
estimate does not necessarily imply large menu costs. This may explain why the thresholds 
are larger in the U.S market than in the Japanese market for Quebec and Ontario pork 
exports. Larue, Gervais and Rancourt (2003) estimated larger menu costs in the Japanese 
market than in the U.S. market for Canadian exporters and justified their findings by pointing 
out that the U.S. and Canada share a common border, common language and similar 
institutions; all factors that suggest small menu costs. Our results do not invalidate their 
conclusions. Finally, the threshold estimates in the Japanese market for Quebec pork exports 
and Ontario pork exports are equal.    17
Given that we can reject the null hypothesis of no menu costs, we can test the 
currency invoicing and PTM hypotheses individually. The null hypothesis of no PTM is a test 
about the statistical significance of the coefficient of the real exchange rate in the 2
nd regime 
of the PTM equation ( ) 01 , 2 :0 H θ = . The null hypothesis of no-PTM behaviour is rejected for 
Quebec exports to Japan. There is no significant evidence of PTM behaviour for Ontario pork 
exports. It is interesting to contrast the current results to linear PTM equations that do not 
include menu costs. We already argued that the empirical model strongly support the 
hypothesis of menu costs; but of particular interest is the statistical significance of the PTM 
coefficient in the linear specifications. The literature cited at the beginning of the paper 
routinely finds significant PTM effects and most of the empirical models only account for a 
linear relationship between the exchange rate and the export price. Table 3 provides the 
coefficient estimates of the linear PTM equations with their standard error between 
parentheses. The p-value for the hypothesis of a zero coefficient for the real exchange 
variable is always lower than 0.01 using conventional asymptotic theory. Hence, a linear 
model finds significant PTM effects in all four equations.  
The null hypothesis of domestic or own currency invoicing is a test about the 
significance of the coefficient of the real exchange rate ( ) 01 , 1 :0 H θ = . This hypothesis is 
strongly rejected in all PTM equations. Finally, the foreign currency invoicing hypothesis is a 
test about the plausibility of:  01 , 1 :1 H θ = − . Although the p-values for this test are not 
reported in Table 2, the bootstrap simulations indicate that this hypothesis is rejected for both 
Quebec PTM equations. We found support for foreign currency invoicing only for Ontario 
pork exports. The p-values for the U.S. and Japanese markets are respectively 0.679 and 
0.127.  
  The previous two hypotheses (currency invoicing and no PTM) can also be tested 
jointly. Define the null hypothesis of domestic currency invoicing and no-PTM as:   18
01 , 1 1 , 2 :0 H θ θ == .  The inference strategy is to write the restrictions on the parameter in (15)
as  0 : H Θ= Rr , where  [] ′ Θ= T θδ  is a 61 ×  vector and the matrix R selects the appropriate 







R  and  [] 00 ′ = r . The test statistic is 
() ( ) ()
1
ˆˆ ˆ cov 2 F
− ′ ⎡⎤ ′ =Θ − Θ Θ − ⎣⎦ Rr R R Rr. The inference is made possible by using 
bootstrap samples as described previously. The joint null hypothesis of domestic currency 
invoicing and no pricing to market behaviour is strongly rejected by the data in all four cases 
as indicated by the p-value of the F statistics in the next to last row in Table 2.  
A similar testing procedure is carried out for the joint foreign currency invoicing and 
no PTM hypotheses. Interestingly, this latter set of hypotheses is not rejected when analyzing 
pork exports from Ontario to either the U.S. or Japanese market. Hence, the data reveals that 
Ontario pork exporting firms invoice in the currency of their customers and that they do not 
possess market power. The evidence about the joint hypothesis of no PTM and foreign 
currency invoicing for Quebec pork exports is not clear given the p-value of 0.053. The joint 
hypothesis of no PTM and foreign currency invoicing is rejected for Quebec pork exports to 
Japan. Given we rejected the single null of no PTM for Japan, the results suggest that pork 
exporters could invoice their exports to Japan in a third country currency. Perhaps, the 
evidence is consistent for Quebec pork exports is consistent with US$ invoicing transactions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper applied the Pricing-to-Market (PTM) theoretical framework developed in 
Larue, Gervais and Rancourt (2003) to investigate whether Canadian pork exporters exercise 
market power in export markets. The theoretical model introduces menu costs that make it 
costly for exporters to revise their prices in response to changes in exchange rates. This   19
introduces a non-linearity between the exchange rate and the export price. This non-linearity 
motivates the specification of a two-regime PTM model to analyze the pricing decisions of 
pork exporters from two Canadian provinces to the U.S. and Japan.   
The empirical model finds that the null hypothesis of no menu costs is rejected for all 
four PTM equations. Evidence of PTM behaviour is weak for pork exports from Ontario. to 
Japan and the U.S. Moreover, the null hypothesis of foreign currency invoicing and no PTM 
effect could not be rejected in the two Ontario PTM equations. Evidence of PTM behaviour is 
stronger for Quebec exports. Significant PTM effects are found in the Japanese market. The 
data rejects the null hypothesis involving either currency invoicing alternative (in yen and 
Can$).  It thus suggests that third country invoicing procedure should be investigated further. 
The results for the U.S. market are mixed. We do not reject the null of no PTM and US$ 
currency invoicing with a p-value of 0.053. When currency invoicing and PTM effects are 
tested separately, the evidence overwhelmingly rejects PTM behaviour in the U.S. market 
and also rejects both currency invoicing hypotheses.   
These results contrast with the ones in Larue et al. (2003). They found significant 
market power exercised by Canadian pork exporters under the assumption that exports are 
invoiced in Canadian currency and using a different time period than in the current study. 
Moreover, they did not formally test the statistical significance of the PTM coefficients in 
their empirical models perhaps because coefficients of threshold cointegration models have 
non-standard distributions. Another implication of the current framework is that linear 
models can yield significant estimates of PTM effects while in reality exporters do not 
possess any market power.  
   20
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Figure 1.  Simulated exchange rate band as a  
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Figure 2a.  Pork meat exports from Quebec to the U.S. and  



















Figure 2b.  Pork meat exports from Ontario to the U.S. and  
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Figure 3a. Quebec export unit values to the U.S. and  



















Figure 3b. Ontario export unit values to the U.S. and  
















Figure 4.  Hog prices in Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba  
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Figure 5. Value of the foreign currency per Can$ weighted  
by the consumer food price index  25
 
Table 1.  Unit root testing  
   ADF test   






of a unit root 
Quebec              
  Export price to the U.S. (NT)    0    -3.37
* 0.46
*   No 
  Export price to Japan (T)    0    -4.61
* 0.22
*   No 
  Hog price (NT)    0    -3.06
* 0.22    No 
Ontario              
  Export price to the U.S. (NT)    2    -2.64
** 0.59
*   Yes 
  Export price to Japan (T)    1    -4.33
** 0.47
*   No 
  Hog price (NT)    1    -3.67*  0.14    No 
U.S. real exchange rate (NT)    0    -2.70
** 2.78
*   Yes 
Japan real exchange rate (NT)    1    -2.63
** 0.23    No 
The symbols 
* and 
** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% and 90% confidence levels respectively. 
Critical values for the ADF test were obtained from Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) and the KPSS critical 
values were obtained from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).  The critical values for the Joint hypothesis of a unit root 
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Table 2.  Estimates of the PTM equation and inference 
   Quebec  Ontario 
Parameters    U.S. Japan U.S.    Japan 
1
st  regime               






 1.09  (0.14) 
0.000






 -0.77  (0.17)
0.000






 0.00  (0.11) 
0.980
2
nd regime       






 0.43  (0.13) 
0.006






 -0.01  (0.09)
0.899






 0.36  (0.09) 
0.002
              
Threshold   1.563 0.973 1.038    0.973
             
Likelihood ratio 













      














              














             
 
 
Table 3.  Linear PTM equations 
   Quebec  Ontario 
Parameters    U.S. Japan U.S.    Japan 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Menu costs were first used in macro models to account for price rigidities (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). 
 
2 Knetter (1994) also argues that asymmetric adjustments can be observed when firms face capacity constraints 
in distribution networks or quantitative restrictions. He conjectured that in such cases PTM should be greater 
after a depreciation of the exporter’s currency. PTM should also be greater after an appreciation of the exporter’s 
currency when an exporting firm is trying to increase its market share subject to the threat of a trade restriction.  
 
3 This would be the case for instance when translating and legal services must be contracted to implement a price 
change. Alternatively, a price change may cause an interruption in deliveries which may differ in length 
depending whether the price is increased or decreased.  In this instance, the menu costs would be asymmetric.   
 
4 Detailed numerical simulations are available from the authors upon request. 
 
5 Andrews and Buchinsky (2000) propose a methodology to choose the number of bootstrap replications to 
achieve a desired level of accuracy. However, it relies upon the asymptotic distribution of the quantities of 
interest and is unfortunately inapplicable in the present context.  
 
6 As alluded to earlier, the pre-pivoting method was also considered in order to conduct statistical inference.  The 
statistic 
*
j t  is not asymptotically pivotal because its distribution depends on unknown parameters; but it still is a 
valid approximation of the 1
st order asymptotic distribution. Pre-pivoting methods (or bootstrap iterations) are 
described in Horowitz (2001). Pre-pivoting entails drawing bootstrap samples from bootstrap samples to create 
an asymptotically pivotal statistic. McCullough and Vinod (1998) present a convincing case for using pre-
pivoting methods. However, our estimation procedure complicates the application given that it involves many 
recursive regressions. For example, denote the number of bootstrap samples from the empirical distribution by J 
and the number of bootstrap sample from the bootstrap distribution by K.  McCullough and Vinod (1998) 
suggest that the product of J and K should be of an order of magnitude slightly greater than T
3. In our case, a 
single hypothesis test would involve over 330 millions regressions given the sequential least square procedure. 
This was deemed too demanding and this is why the inference was carried out using the single bootstrap method. 
However, the double bootstrap with J = 999 and K = 200 was carried out as an experiment. It produced p-values 
significantly different in some instances and is worth investigating in future research. 
 
7 As Larue et al. (2004) and Gervais et al. (2004) explained, there may exist significant capacity constraints in 
the hog/pork industry due to lags between hog production and marketing decisions.  In particular, the current hog 
price may not be strongly correlated with producers’ supply of live hogs. Marketing lags are likely to influence 
PTM outcomes and it deserves to be investigated in future research. 
 
8 It is also interesting to compare the bootstrap critical values with the asymptotic critical values reported in 
Hansen (2000). The empirical critical values are always larger than the corresponding critical values. For 
example, the empirical critical value of the likelihood ratio test of  0 γ =  at the 95% confidence level is never 
inferior to 14.45 while the asymptotic critical value is 8.75 (Hansen, 2000, p. 582). 